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DARREL L. ROSS and CLELLA C. 
ROSS, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 960585-CA 
Priority No. 15 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this civil appeal from a summary judgment pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996) as a case assigned to it by the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Appellees-Defendants accept the issues stated by Appellants and the legal 
standards of review for summary judgment. According to Appellants, their issues are: 
1. The trial court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law to Defendants 
(based upon the statute of limitations for actions on written contracts); 
2. The trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that Plaintiffs' claims 
commenced to run in July 1984 and were barred on August 1991 when this action was 
filed; and 
3. The trial judge could not consider a second motion for summary judgment, 
because a prior motion had been denied. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
78-12-23, Within six years — Mesne profits of real prop-
erty — Instrument in writing. 
An action may be brought within six years: 
(1) for the mesne profits of real property; 
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instru-
ment in writing, except those mentioned in Section 78-12-22. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, April 29, 1996, deleted former Subsection (3) 
Supp., 104-12-23; L. 1984, ch. 16, § 2; 1996, regarding distribution of cnminai proceeds to 
ch. 79, § 109; 1996, ch. 210, § 5, victims. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend- This section is set out as reconciled by the 
ment by ch. 79, effective April 29, 1996, in the Of&ce of Legislative Research and General 
introductory paragraph, substituted "An action Counsel. 
may be brought within" for "Within"; deleted Cross-References. — Product Liability Act, 
"An action" at the beginning of Subsections (1) statute of limitations, § 78-15-3. 
to (3); and in Subsections (1) and (2), substi- Promise to pay extends period, § 78-12-44. 
tuted a semicolon for a period. Three-year limitation penod for action on 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 210, effective written insurance contract, § 31A-21-313. 
78-12-26. Within three years. 
An action may be brought within three years: 
(1) for waste, or trespass upon or injury k) real property; except that 
when waste or trespass is committed by means of underground works 
upon any mining claim, the cause of action does not accrue until the 
discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting such waste or 
trespass; 
(2) for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including ac-
tions for specific recovery thereof; except that in all cases where the 
subject of the action is a domestic animal usually included in the term 
"livestock," which at the time of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if 
the animal strayed or was stolen from the true owner without the owner's 
fault, the cause does not accrue until the owner has actual knowledge of 
such facts as would put a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the 
possession of the animal by the defendant; 
(3) for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of 
action in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved 
party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake; 
(4) for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other than for a 
penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where in special 
cases a different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this state; 
(5) to enforce liability imposed by Section 78-17-3, except that the cause 
of action does not accrue until the aggrieved party knows or reasonably 
should know of the harm suffered. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; c. 1943, Cross-References. — "Action" includes spe-
Supp., 104-12-26; L. 1986, ch. 143, § 1; 1996, cial proceeding, § 78-12-46. 
ch. 79, § 111. Livestock branding, Title 4, Chapter 24. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend- Product Liability Act, statute of limitations, 
ment, effective April 29, 1996, in the introduc- § 78-15-3. 
tory paragraph substituted "An action may be p .
 h t o f a c t i o n for w a g t e > § 7 8 . 3 8 . 2 
brought within for ^Vithin ; deleted An ac-
 n i i f l i i „aQ„ nA . , * 0/vf4/vr,a n„ ;„0„r.o«^ 
^ » ± ^ i. *o i_ _JJ
 / 1 X , / n Three-year period for actions on insurance 
toon at the beginning of Subsecfaons (l) to (5);
 c o n t r a c t s § 3 1 A . 2 i . 3 l 3 . 
and made stylistic changes. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: 
Plaintiffs Buyers appeal a summary judgment in an action claiming breach 
of contract and seeking rescission, damages and exemplary damages for fraud against the 
Defendants Sellers of three acres in Duchesne County, Utah. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Decision Below: 
Plaintiffs Buyers commenced this action on August 21, 1991 alleging that 
the Defendants Sellers breached two Uniform Real Estate Contracts. Plaintiffs' 
Complaint alleged breach and rescission (Count 1), damages for the alleged breach 
(Count 2), and exemplary damages for fraud (Count 3). (CompL, R. 1-11) 
After depositions of the parties and other discovery, Defendants moved for 
summary judgment in May, 1992 (1st Motion, R.36) because the undisputed facts 
established that the action was barred by the six-year statute of limitations for written 
contracts (Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23 (1996)) and by the three-year statute for any claim 
of fraud (Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26(3) (1996)). 
In a signed "Civil Minute Entry," dated September 14, 1992, the trial court 
(Judge A. Payne) concluded that the Plaintiffs' "cause of action for breach would have 
existed by July of 1984, and six-year statute would have expired prior to the filing of this 
action in August of 1991." (J. Payne Dec. ff7, R.85; Add. B) The court further 
concluded that "The Court will hold that the [claims for breach]. . . has run. Absent a 
further agreement to adjust the boundaries or to return the payments... the statute of 
3 
limitations has run . . . ." Id. at 1f 11, R.87. However, the court declined to rule as a 
matter of law that there was no fraud because discovery was insufficient for the court to 
rule on the legal effect of the parties' discussions "after the breach was discovered." Id. 
Accordingly, the trial court denied Defendants' first motion for summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs were thereafter permitted to amend their Complaint. The 
Amended Complaint is identical in its claims of breach of contract (Counts 1 and 2) but 
adds additional allegations to Count 3 as the fraud claim against the Defendant Mr. Ross. 
(Am. CompL, R.173) Again, the Defendants answered, denying the allegations of breach 
and fraud, and inter alia, reasserting the statute of limitation defenses. (Answer, R. 183) 
After Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and a second deposition of Plaintiff 
R. Cordner directed to his new allegations, Defendants moved again for summary 
judgment based upon the applicable limitation statutes and upon the Plaintiffs' failure to 
establish a prima facie claim for fraud. (2d Motion, R. 198, 247) After oral argument, 
Defendants' motion was granted. Summary judgment was entered, dismissing each of 
Plaintiffs' claims, because the statute of limitations had expired. (Order Granting 
Summary Judgment, R.298, Add. A) 
C. Statement of the Facts: 
Appellees do not object to the relevant facts contained in Appellants' brief. 
However, many of the stated facts are either not relevant to the issue before the court or 
are interwoven with conclusions not supported by the record. Accordingly, Appellees 
4 
restate the relevant, material facts properly reflected by the record, in the light most 
favorable to the Plaintiffs' evidence.1 
On June 10, 1981, Plaintiff Robert Cordner and the Defendant Darrel Ross, 
and their wives, entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract whereby Plaintiffs Cordner 
agreed to buy, and Defendants Ross agreed to sell, two acres of undeveloped property in 
Duchesne County near Roosevelt, with a $6,000.00 yearly payment each June. (Compl. 
1(4, R. 1-4) 
On December 27, 1982, the parties entered into a second Uniform Real 
Estate Contract whereby Cordners agreed to buy and Ross' agreed to sell an additional 
one-acre piece adjacent to the original two acres, with a $3,000.00 yearly payment each 
December. (Plaintiffs' Compl. [^8, R.l-4) (The Uniform Real Estate Contracts are 
attached to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, Addendum E.) 
Defendant Clella C. Ross, Mr. Ross' wife, did not have any involvement 
with the sale of the property or any dealing between Cordner and Ross except to just sign 
the sale contracts. (R. Cordner dep., Vol. 1, p. 10; Aff. of Clella Ross, R.250-251) 
For the next two years, Mr. Cordner made some, but not all, of his 
payments on the contract. His payments were erratic. He made some payments when 
Mr. Ross would come to get some money, and Mr. Cordner would give to Ross as much 
1
 Record pages are referred to by their page number. The first deposition of Plaintiff 
Robert Cordner (Add. C) is referred to as "R. Cordner dep., Vol. 1, p. "; the second 
deposition of Plaintiff Robert Cordner (Add. D) is referred to as R. Cordner dep., Vol. 2, p.__ 
5 
as he then had. (R. Cordner dep., Vol. 1, p.20 and exh. 3; Vol. 2, pp.21-22) For 
example, on January 1, 1984, Plaintiff Cordner issued a check to Defendant Ross for 
$191.77 to "help out" with taxes on the property. (R. Cordner dep., Vol. 1, pp.21-22) 
In April 1984, Darrel Ross granted Moonlake Electric Association, Inc. (the 
local power utility) a right-of-way easement for high power electric lines along a portion 
of the property which he had contracted to sell to the Plaintiffs. (R.59) The line ran 
across the eastern side of the acreage Plaintiffs were buying. (R. Cordner dep., Vol. 1., 
pp.23-24) 
Mr. Cordner became aware of the power line across the property in the 
latter part of June or July of 1984 when he visited the property and observed that the 
power line had been put in place across the property. (R. Cordner dep., Vol. 1, pp.23-24) 
A few days after seeing the installed power line, Plaintiff Cordner 
complained to the Defendant Darrel Ross about the construction and placement of the 
power line on the property and refused to give Ross a check for the payment due June 1st. 
Robert Cordner testified that at that time he told Darrel Ross that Ross had "violated the 
contract, and that he (Cordner) wanted his money back." Cordner informed Ross that he 
"didn't want the property, he [Ross] could sell it to somebody else and give me my 
money back." (R. Cordner depos., Vol 1, p.25; Vol. 2, p.24) 
Mr. Cordner then testified that, in this discussion in June or July 1984, Ross 
asked if Cordner would be willing to adjust the boundaries of the property to avoid the 
easement. Cordner replied that "that may work," but that "was as far as it went." 
6 
(R. Cordner dep., Vol. 1, p.27) Cordner testified that there was no agreement to modify 
the contract and that he told Ross that he (Cordner) would see what Ross would propose 
and, only then, he "might be willing to honor the contract." (R. Cordner dep., Vol. 2, 
pp.23-26) 
Cordner refused to make any more payments on the contract. However, on 
November 30, 1984, Cordner gave Ross a $211.69 check to "help out with taxes" for the 
past year on the properties. (R. Cordner dep., Vol. 1, p.29) At that time, Cordner asked 
Ross, "What about the power line?" According to Cordner, Ross only responded that "he 
was working on it" or "I'll get back to you." (R. Cordner dep., Vol 2, pp. 22-23, 32) 
After that conversation in November 1984, Cordner made no further inquiry 
of Mr. Ross and never followed up for over six years. Mr. Cordner did not make any 
effort to contact Ross and never tried to get back with him. Cordner claimed that during 
this entire period, he was just waiting for Ross "to contact him." (Cordner dep., Vol. 2, 
pp.22-23, 28-29) 
This November 30, 1984 discussion between Plaintiff Robert Cordner and 
Defendant Darrel Ross was the last time that Plaintiff Cordner ever talked to Ross 
concerning the property. Plaintiffs never wrote to Defendants or had an attorney write to 
Defendants about this transaction. (R. Cordner dep., Vol. 1, p.30) The check for taxes 
dated November 30, 1984 was the last check or payment of any kind made by the 
Plaintiffs to the Defendants regarding the purchased properties. (R. Cordner dep., Vol. 1, 
p.22) 
7 
In December 1985, Defendants transferred the property by Special 
Warranty Deed recorded January 6, 1986 (Entry No. 250927 in Book A-138, Pages 626-
627) to George W. Mills and Diana F. Mills. (R.61-62) 
After November 30, 1984, Plaintiff Robert Cordner visited and observed 
the property site in Roosevelt, Utah on at least four occasions (R. Cordner dep., Vol. 1, 
pp.32-33) but did not legally pursue any claim or contract against Defendants. Plaintiffs 
did not file their Complaint against the Ross5 until August 21, 1991, over seven years 
after Cordner told Ross that Ross had breached the contract and that Cordner wanted his 
money back. 
Attached hereto as Addenda C and D are the relevant pages from the first 
deposition of Plaintiff Robert Cordner, pages 23-33, and the second deposition of Mr. 
Cordner, pages 21-29. 
8 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Based upon undisputed facts, and viewing all Plaintiffs' evidence in a light most 
favorable to Plaintiffs: 
j 1. Plaintiffs' claims for breach of the Uniform Real Estate Contracts and 
rescission are barred by the six-year statute of limitation, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23. 
Plaintiffs knew in July 1984 that Defendants had created an encumbrance by granting the 
utility easement. The utility had already taken possession. The power line was 
constructed. 
According to their own evidence, Plaintiffs treated the contracts as 
breached by Defendants, refused to make further payments, demanded their payments 
back, and rejected any further interest in the property. Plaintiffs' cause of action 
I 
commenced to run in July 1984 but Plaintiffs sat on their rights. No legal action was 
commenced until August 1991 - seven years later and Plaintiffs' claims are now barred as 
a matter of law. 
2. Plaintiffs' claim in Cause III is insufficient as a matter of law to state a 
claim of fraud. The undisputed evidence also fails to establish any basis to claim fraud or 
concealment, or other ground to avoid the statutes of limitation. There is insufficient 
evidence to establish even a prima facie claim of fraud. 
3.1 The trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering Defendants' 
second motion for summary judgment after Plaintiffs filed an "Amended Complaint" and 
additional discoveiy was adduced. 
9 
4. There is no evidence to support Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Clella 
Ross beyond mere breach of contract, now barred by the six-year statute of limitation. 




PLAINTIFFS' CONTRACT AND FRAUD CLAIMS 
ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS 
The trial court properly determined that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statutes 
of limitations - six years for contracts (Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23 (1996)) and three 
i 
i 
years for fraud (Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26(3)(1996)). Plaintiffs' entire argument 
I 
attempts to confuse the simple and straightforward evidence which is undisputed. By 
Plaintiffs' own testimony, the Plaintiff knew in July 1984 that Ross had violated the 
1 
contract and granted the utility easement. The power line was in place. At that time, 
Plaintiff Cordner rejected further performance of the contract, called the contract in 
breach, and said he didn't want the property, and demanded his money back. Yet, the 
i 
Plaintiffs did not file this action until August 1991 - over seven years later. Although 
I 
Plaintiffs are entitled to view the evidence in the light most favorable to them, they 
cannot ignore the plain and obvious meaning of those facts. 
In July 1984, Plaintiff Cordner met with Defendant Darrel Ross. At that time, 
Plaintiff had observed that the power line was installed on the property towards the east 
side. The Plaintiff said he told Mr. Ross "at that time that the property was no good to 
I 
me with an easement down through there, . . . and that I didn't want the property, he 
could sell it to somebody else and give me my money back . . . . I said it's no good to 
I 
me, I want my money back . . . ." (Add. C, p.25) 
11 
When Plaintiff Cordner again complained about the poles, Mr. Ross asked, "will 
you take your principle back and not interest?" Mr. Cordner replied, ". . . [H]ell no, you 
violated the contract, I want my money back." (R. Cordner Dep., Vol. 1, p.26; R. 
Cordner dep. Vol. 2, p.24) Plaintiff refused to make any further payment on the purchase 
price, although he later did pay $211.00 to help with the past year (1984) property taxes. 
Despite Plaintiffs' protestations now, in 1984 he considered and treated the power 
line easement as a breach by Mr. Ross of the contracts and demanded his money back. 
By word and deed, he repudiated the contracts. The court properly concluded that the 
six-year statute of limitation for breach of contract commenced to run at that time. Even 
Plaintiffs' complaint and amended complaint allege that Plaintiffs informed Defendants 
of Plaintiffs' rescission of the contracts and that Defendants breached the contracts by 
conveying the power line easement in 1984. (R. 170-171, ffl[16 and 23, Add. E) 
Plaintiffs argue at length to avoid the clear meaning and consequence of their own 
evidence. For example, they now claim that, notwithstanding their allegations and 
testimony, the contracts were not breached until the property was later conveyed by 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs' arguments that their claims did not arise until a later conveyance fail 
because: 
a. In 1984, Plaintiff Cordner himself declared the contracts violated, 
demanded his money back, and told Mr. Ross he should sell the property to someone 
else; 
12 
b. No promise or commitment was ever made to change boundaries and Mr. 
Cordner made no agreement to "honor" the contract. (Add. D, p.23-25); 
c. The several authorities cited by Defendants do not support their | 
contentions. The authorities cited support the determination that, as a matter of law, the 
cause of action arose in July 1984; and 
d. Many of the Plaintiffs' various arguments and theories were never argued to 
I 
the trial court and are raised for the first time on appeal. 
The encumbrance "defect" rejected by Cordner was the easement and power line, 
I 
which he treated as a noncurable "defect". See Neves v. Wright, 638 P.2d 1195, 1199 
(Utah 1981). In July 1984, the utility easement had been given and recorded, and the 
power line constructed. Mr. Ross told Cordner it was to their "benefit" to "get along with 
the power company," (Add. C, p.25) to which Cordner replied, "Hell no, you violated the 
i i 
I 
contract." At that time, Plaintiff treated the contracts as violated and terminated, and he 
believed he had no commitment to honor them. 
Compromise suggestions by Defendant Ross were either rejected by Mr. Cordner, 
or, at least, no agreement was reached. By July 1984, Mr. Cordner knew everything from 
I 
which he could reasonably ascertain that he had a cause of action for breach of contract. 
He certainly treated the contract and Mr. Ross as if he had such a claim. There was no 
i 
"belated discovery of key facts" to justify the later application of a discovery rule. 
Moreover, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs failed to exercise reasonable diligence to pursue 
13 
and seek proper redress for Cordners' grievance. Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 
Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 579-580 (Utah App. 1996). 
Time limitation on a cause of action commences to run upon the breach of the 
contract. In an analogous situation of the breach of covenant, a claim for the breach 
accrues when the grantee first receives notice of the conflicting encumbrance. 
Christiansen v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 590 P.2d 1251, 1252-1253 (Utah 1979) (finding a 
factual issue as to when the grantee obtained notice of the previously granted easement). 
Generally, the obligation to remove an encumbrance is effective immediately upon 
discovery of the encumbrance. Upland Industries Corp. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 
634 P.2d 638, 643 (Utah 1984). In the instant case, that question is undisputably 
answered as of July 1984. Formal demand is not required and does not avoid the statute 
running. Fredricksen v. Knight Land Corp., 667 P.2d 34, 38 (Utah 1983). 
Plaintiffs' cited case, Leavitt v. Blohm, 357 P.2d 190 (Utah 1960), rejects 
Plaintiffs' position here and offers them little comfort. There, the seller sued for unpaid 
contract payments and the buyer counterclaimed for return of payments made. The court 
first observed that the parties' obligations run both ways. A buyer cannot enforce her 
rights when she fails to make her payments. Conversely, when the seller fails to perform, 
he cannot force the buyer to do so. The court then reversed the lower court's judgment 
for the buyer on her counterclaim. The court held that when the buyer informed the seller 
that she would not make further payments until the encumbrance was "straightened out," 
later relinquished possession, and made no effort for return of her contract payments, the 
14 
effect of her conduct appeared to treat the contract as abandoned and terminated. The 
court held that the contract should be so regarded, and the buyer should not be allowed to 
I 
resurrect her claim for her payments. {Id. at 194) Considering the conduct of both buyer 
i 
i 
and seller, the court left them in the status quo, just as the trial court did in this case. 
Plaintiffs' other authorities provide little support to them other than to state the 
I 
general rules. In Woodward v. Allen, 265 P.2d 398 (Utah 1953), a terse decision holding 
the buyer liable for payments due, the court observed that the alleged title defect was a 
mere inaccurate description and boundary conflict - readily remedial, and the buyer could 
I 
not avoid the contract. Likewise, in Walker v. C.C. Bintz and Shawf Inc., 3 U.2d 162, 
280 P.2d 767 (1955), Justice Henriod again concludes that the seller was entitled to a 
reasonable time to "clear" his title defect before the buyer could rescind. There, the 
buyer had repudiated the contract and the seller had sought enforcement. The decision 
further opines that since the buyer had repudiated the agreement before the seller was to 
perform, the "latter had no duty further to perfect title . . . ." 3 U.2d at 164. In neither of 
these cases did the buyers sit on their rights for over seven years, after expressly 
repudiating and treating the contract as abandoned. 
I 
In Neves v. Wright 638 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court refused 
to allow buyers to use the sellers' temporary conveyance of legal title as a sword to 
rescind a real estate contract. The sellers had temporarily conveyed title to the parents to 
i 
avoid potential creditors. The court applied the general rule that a seller need not always 
have clear title during the executory period of a contract, but also reinforced the caveat 
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that if it "plainly appears that a seller has . . . encumbered his ownership so that he will 
not be able to fulfill his contract, he cannot insist that a buyer continue to make payments. 
Id. at 1198. The purpose of the rule is to enhance the alienability of real estate. 
Application of the rule and the caveat here to allow a buyer's claim after seven years of 
inaction certainly does not serve this public policy. Rather, alienation of realty would 
have to await judicial determination of every abandoned real estate contract. 
Under Neves, the basic test is whether the seller's encumbrance of defects, "by 
their nature, cannot be removed by the seller as a practical matter . . . ," and is of such a 
nature that the seller "neither has title 'nor in a practical sense any prospect of acquiring 
it.'" Id. 638 P.2d at 1199 (quoting Danys v. Dean Vincent, Inc., 255 Or 233, 465 P.2d 
702, 706 (1970)). 
Under Neves, the contracts were clearly treated as breached by Defendants as of 
July 1984. Plaintiffs knew of the breach and treated it as such at that time. The power 
line had been constructed. Cordner was told, in essence, to "get along with the power 
company." (Add. C, p.25) At that time, he affirmatively asserted the contract was 
violated, refused to pay further and wanted his money back. Were Plaintiffs' present 
arguments valid, there would never be any breach, even today, because Defendant might 
still be able to re-obtain title in a "reasonable time" after Plaintiffs' full payment. 
Plaintiffs also fail to discuss the more recently decided cases since Neves. 
Although these cases do not involve the statute of limitations, they are indicative of what 
encumbrances are irremedial. For example, in Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1225 
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(Utah 1984), the court held that unexcepted utility easements were irremedial. They 
breached the executory contract even before the deed was to be delivered and entitled the 
buyer to rescind. In Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716 (Utah App. 1990), 
this court affirmed a buyer's summary judgment for rescission of a sale contract because 
a pipeline easement across the property was an irremedial defect as a matter of law and 
I 
constituted a substantial encumbrance on the fee title. In Callister v. Millstream 
Associates, Inc., 738 P.2d 662 (Utah App. 1987), a zoning restriction created an 
encumbrance that was not remedial, entitling the buyer to immediate rescission. In these 
i 
cases, it plainly appeared that the seller could not fulfill the contract terms, and that the 
buyer promptly rescinded upon discovering the title defect. However, in the instant case, 
Plaintiff Cordner advised Mr. Ross, in effect, that the installed power line was a 
substantial, irremedial encumbrance when he said, "I told him at that time that the 
property was no good to me with an easement down through there . . . and that I didn't 
1 
want the property . . . ." (Add. C, p.25) Cordner told Ross to sell the property to 
someone else and give him his money back. 
Had the Plaintiffs made the purchase payments when due or brought action within 
the limitations period, legal remedies might well have remained available to them. 
However, they clearly chose to do nothing until seven years after the breach, cf. 
Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 578-580 (Utah App. 1996). 
1 
Even here the "discovery" rule provides Plaintiffs no comfort. When a plaintiff is 
fully informed of the facts and information as would cause a person of ordinary 
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intelligence and prudence to inquire or to act, but does not do so, then the person is 
deemed to have discovered all, and the limitations period commences, cf Gibson v. 
Jenson, 48 Utah 244, 158 Pac. 426, 427 (1916). Plaintiffs had sufficient information and 
facts in 1984 to know of the extent and nature of the easement and defect and 
Defendants' breach. United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 
889 (Utah 1993). 
Plaintiff also complains that the trial court acted without "any evidence" as to the 
installed power line and easement. (Applts.' brief, p.21) First, we note that Plaintiffs did 
not present any evidence disputing the easement's location and never made this objection 
or argument below. Also, the argument is plainly contrary to the Plaintiffs' allegation 
that both contracts were breached by the utility easement. Second, the evidence that the 
court did act upon was Mr. Cordner's own testimony where he saw the power line and 
described how he treated the easement and contracts. Cordner saw the power line in 
place across the east portion of the property he was buying. Cordner told Ross that the 
contract was "violated;" that Cordner didn't want the property and that Ross could sell to 
someone else. The property was "no good" to Cordner with an easement, and Cordner 
demanded his money back. (Add. C, pp.23-26; Add D, pp.24-25) 
Plaintiffs' argue that they had no claim until they later "discovered" that the Ross' 
had conveyed the property in December 1985. As noted, this argument is inconsistent 
with the stated allegations of the Amended Complaint and with Mr. Cordner's testimony. 
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Plaintiffs argue that, even if the statute of limitations did begin in July 1984 and 
their contract claims are now barred, there was still a subsequent, separate "breach" 
which is still actionable. (Applts. Brief, pp.23-24) However, this is not a case where 
individual payments create separate causes of actions. Because, as he testified, Mr. 
Cordner considered the contract breached and repudiated it, demanding his payments 
I 
back, he cannot later try to revive his contract. The argument suggests that, after a breach 
i 
of contract, each new day creates a new and separate cause of action. Plaintiffs' 
argument is illogical and falls of its own weight. Defendants' breach by encumbering the 
I 
title did not create separate causes of action. 
1 
The fallacy of Plaintiffs' rational is evidenced by the authorities cited at pages 24 
and 25 of Appellants' brief. For example, in Ashe v. State, 572 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1977), 
I 
the court merely held that a cause of action arises when an action can be maintained to 
enforce plaintiffs' legal right. In Tolman v. K-Mart Enterprises of Utah, 572 P.2d 1374 
(Utah 1977), a claim for false imprisonment arises when the plaintiff is arrested, and not 
1 
later when acquitted. Moreover, John Price Associates, Inc. v. Davis, 588 P.2d 713 
I 
(Utah 1978), is an action on a promissory note, each payment of which creates a separate 
obligation. These decisions do not even remotely support the proposition for which they 
are cited by Plaintiffs. 
I 
Having treated the contracts as violated, refusing to pay further, demanding his 
money back, and telling Defendant he didn't want the property, Plaintiff Cordner is in no 
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position to now claim that he has other unspecified rights in the contracts that create new, 
unstated causes of action. 
Plaintiffs were not lulled into any "false sense of security" nor were they 
prevented from discovering any fact. Neither was there any "reasonable reliance" that 
precluded Plaintiffs' action for over seven years. Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 
1125, 1130 (Utah 1992). 
There was no later "discovery" by Plaintiffs of their claim. Walker Drug Co., Inc. 
v. LaSal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1995) does not support Plaintiffs' arguments. 
Rather, the credibility of Plaintiffs' arguments is akin to Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 
445 (Utah 1996) wherein the court stated, ". . . we cannot turn a blind eye to the 
nonmoving party's evidence . . . . Harline's own evidence compels us to affirm the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment." See also Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 53-54 
(Utah 1996) (holding summary judgment is appropriate when the facts are so tenuous, 
vague and insufficient that the claim fails as a matter of law); Anderson v. Dean Witter, 
920 P.2d at 570-580. 
The facts of Plaintiffs' conduct, repudiation of the property and contract in July 
1984, and resulting failure to act are clear and undisputed. The only proper legal 
conclusion that can be drawn therefrom is that Plaintiffs allowed their claims to expire 
under the statutes of limitations. Summary Judgment was properly granted to Defendants 
as a matter of law and should be affirmed. 
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POINT II 
THE FRAUD ALLEGATIONS IN CAUSE OF ACTION III 
AND PLAINTIFFS' EVIDENCE FAIL TO ESTABLISH 
EVEN A PRIMA FACIE CLAIM OF FRAUD 
j In J. Payne's Decision (Add. B), the trial court found that the evidence then before 
it was incomplete and that there might still be"an issue as to whether the parties entered 
into an agreement wherein the Sellers would resell the property and return the monies 
which purchaser had paid. (Add. B., [^8, emphasis added) Referring to the fraud claim or 
some such oral contract, the court observed that: 
"[a]bsent a further agreement to adjust the boundaries or to return the 
payments (or sellers actions which would reasonably lead the purchasers to 
believe [the same] . . ., the statute of limitations has run on purchasers cause 
of action. However, the facts . . . presented to the court are not sufficient 
for the court to rule on the legal effect of the parties' discussions after the 
breach was discovered. (Add. B, [^11) I 
After this ruling, the Plaintiffs were permitted to amend their complaint. Causes I 
and II, for breach and rescission, in the Amended Complaint are identical to the 
allegations in the original Complaint, word-for-word. (R. 167-172) Only Plaintiffs' fraud 
allegations in Cause III are restated in the Amended Complaint. {See Am. Compl., Add. 
E) j 
The fraud claim in the Amended Complaint (Cause III; Add. E) alleges that, in the 
July 1984 meeting: 
l.| Mr. Cordner had demanded all his money back. 
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2. Ross then offered to change the boundaries and said that he had enough 
property to do so. fl[27) 
3. Cordner indicated to Ross that if he [Ross] could change the boundaries on 
the property, that he [Cordner] "might still be willing to honor the contract." fl[27) 
4. Ross knew that his "statements" were untrue or reckless and "intended" to 
deceive Cordner into waiting for Ross to cure the problem by either paying back the 
money or changing boundaries. fl[28) 
5. Cordner relied on this representation of Ross and "waited for Ross" to cure 
the defect. fl[30) 
6. Ross was willful and malicious. 0f32) (Am. Compl., R. 173-174; Add. E) 
These allegations, even though based upon Mr. Cordner's own testimony, are 
insufficient as a matter of law to state a sufficient claim of "fraud." Moreover, Mr. 
Cordner's subsequent deposition further established that there was no agreement, no 
"promise" and no reasonable basis for Plaintiffs to sit idle for over six and a half years. 
(R. Cordner dep., Vol. 2, pp. 20-29) 
Mr. Cordner affirmed that he never agreed to anything. (R. Cordner dep., Vol. 2, 
pp. 23-25) Mr. Cordner testified that when he asked Ross about the easement problem in 
November 1984, all Mr. Ross said was "I'm working on it." There was no promise or 
representation that Ross would do anything - and no agreement was ever made by 
Cordner. However, Mr. Cordner did not do anything to follow up after 1984. 
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Although Mr. Cordner considered the contracts breached and demanded return of 
his payments .in July 1994, there was never any agreement by Cordner or promise by 
Ross that any money would be repaid or that the boundaries would be moved. Nothing 
prevented the continued running of the limitation statute. There is no evidence that Ross 
said or represented anything concerning any presently existing fact that was fraudulent or 
deceptive, or that gave Cordner any cause to reasonably remain inactive and aloof of his 
legal right for seven years. Even if there were, Mr. Cordner said he only "might be 
willing" to honor the contract. (R. 173) 
Not only does Mr. Cordner's testimony fail to show any claim for fraud against or 
misrepresentation by Mr. Ross, but the amended allegations of Cause III are also 
woefully insufficient to show fraud. 
No agreement by Cordner is alleged or evidenced. There is no allegation of any 
promise to change boundaries or to give the money back that Cordner demanded. There 
is no evidence that Ross ever promised or agreed either to return the money paid or to 
change boundaries. 
Plaintiffs only claim that Mr. Ross' offer to see what he could do was untrue. The 
reliance alleged is only that Cordner was "waiting for Ross to cure the defect." Yet, there 
was no agreement or promise that Ross would or could do so. Such a promise, even if 
made, would not be of a present, existing fact but, at best, would only give rise to a new 
oral agreement. There is no allegation of any fact that, by doing nothing for seven years, 
Cordner reasonably relied upon Ross to do something. 
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To establish a claim of fraud, the Plaintiffs must show evidence to establish each 
of the following essential elements, among others: 
1. A representation was made "concerning a presently existing material fact." 
In this case, there was no agreement or representation. Even a promise of "I'll get back to 
you" is not a representation of a presently existing material fact. 
2. The representation was false, and the Defendant knew it to be false. 
Defendant's statement that he would see what he could do was not necessarily false when 
made. There is no evidence that anything Ross said was false or fraudulent when stated. 
3. The Plaintiff reasonably relied upon the representation. As a matter of law, 
Mr. Cordner could not have reasonably relied on any offer by Ross when Plaintiff states 
he had no agreement with Ross, that Plaintiff considered the contract breached and 
demanded his money back, and that he was not obligated to honor the contract. 
See Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 144-45, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952). 
The failure to prove evidence on any of the several elements of fraud is fatal to 
Plaintiffs' claim. Schuhman v. Green River Motel 835 P.2d 992, 994 (Utah App. 1992). 
As a matter of law, the allegations in Count III of the Amended Complaint are insufficient 
to establish fraud. Williams v. State Farm, 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982). Even on 
summary judgment, this is the yardstick against which Plaintiffs' insufficient allegations 
and evidence must be measured. When Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges facts which, even if 
true, are insufficient to establish fraud, the claim is properly dismissed. Educators 
Mutual Ins. Assn. v. Allied Property and Casualty Ins. Co., 890 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1995). 
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Regardless of whether Cordner's pleadings alleged sufficient facts to pass "fraud" 
muster, any such claim would also be barred by the fraud statute of limitations, Utah 
Code Ann. §78-12-26(3) (1996), based upon Cordner's own testimony that there was 
never any agreement to do anything and that, depending on what Ross proposed, he 
(Cordner) only "might be willing to honor the contract." The limitations period began to 
run at that time on any claim of fraud. 
Even if one could assume that there was some oral promise in July 1984 by Ross 
to do something, that promise would arise only to an oral contract, and by August 1991, 
was barred by the consecutive running of both statutes of limitation. Sections 78-12-25 
and -26(3), over the seven years of Cordner's inaction. By the end of four years from 
July 1984, any right to enforce the oral agreement had expired. Cordner should have 
known that, by July 1988, any alleged promise by Ross was not being fulfilled. Any oral 
misrepresentation by Ross was, by then, either discovered or should have been 
discovered. Even if Cordner was allowed another three years under §78-12-26(3) to sue 
for any claimed fraudulent misrepresentation, he still did nothing until well after July 
1991. 
Plaintiffs' amended allegations of fraud and their evidence are insufficient as a 
matter of law to establish any prima facie claim against the Defendants. Even if there 
was some "fraudulent" representation by Mr. Ross in July 1994, any action in August 
1991 was barred by the four-year statute of limitation for oral contracts and the three-year 
statute for frauds. Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' fraud claim was proper. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED 
DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs claim that the trial court could not grant Defendants' second motion for 
summary judgment merely because the first motion was "denied" by Judge Payne. 
Although the Plaintiffs cite numerous cases and the standards for summary judgment, the 
Plaintiffs do not understand the proper application of those standards to this case. 
Plaintiffs have misinterpreted Judge Payne's signed "Minute Entry" decision, Add. B 
(referred to herein as "J. Payne's Decision") and ignored the undisputed evidence. 
Plaintiffs also ignore the numerous cases holding that the reconsideration of summary 
judgment is appropriate after amended pleadings are filed and new evidence obtained. 
Plaintiffs criticize the summary judgment by Judge J. Anderson (to whom the case 
was reassigned after Judge Payne) as one judge overruling another. Contrary to 
Plaintiffs' assertion, a trial court judge is "free to change a ruling until a final decision is 
finally rendered." Trembly v. Mrs. Field's Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306 (Utah App.1994). 
Denial of summary judgment is not a final order, and the "law of the case" doctrine does 
not necessarily preclude a second district court judge from revisiting a prior judge's 
nonfinal ruling. Id. at 1311. See also Richardson v. Grand Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395, 
397 (Utah 1977) (when additional evidence is adduced, or "new light" presented, the 
previous denial of summary judgment is not binding); Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 739-
40 (Utah 1990) (law of the case doctrine does not prevent a judge from reconsidering 
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previous nonfmal orders); State v. O 'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 697 (Utah App. 1993); Utah R. 
Civil P. 54(b). Even Plaintiffs' own cited authority does not support their contention. 
Both Sinner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil Inc., 692 P.2d 735, 736 (Utah 1984) and 
Richardson, 572 P.2d at 397 state that, when new evidence or discovery presents the 
issue in a "different light," reconsideration is appropriate. 
The plain language of Judge Payne's Decision expressly affirms Defendants' 
position on all issues but the Count III claim of fraud. Judge Payne's decision opined 
that, although action on the written contracts was barred, there was incomplete evidence 
as to whether the parties might have made a subsequent "further agreement to adjust the 
boundaries or to return the payments . . . The facts which have been presented to the 
court are not sufficient for the court to rule on the legal effect of the parties discussions 
after the breach was discovered. . . ." (Add. B, ^fll). 
After Judge Payne's ruling, Mr. Cordner was reexamined in his second deposition 
regarding those "discussions." (R. Cordner dep., Vol. 2, pp.23-26) Mr. Cordner there 
admitted that he had made no agreement with Ross after telling Ross that he (Ross) had 
violated the contract. (Id.) Mr. Cordner clearly testified that after demanding his money 
back, he did not make any agreement later with Mr. Ross' suggestion, and that there was 
no "promise" by Ross to move the boundaries or to return payments. (Cordner dep., Vol. 
2, pp.24-27) Cordner didn't believe that when Ross offered to move the boundaries, 
Ross had any intent to do so. Cordner never agreed to any change of boundaries. The 
only claim of fraud that Cordner makes was that Ross did not "get back" with Cordner. 
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(Id. at pp.28, 29) There was no testimony of any "promise" to change boundaries, or that 
Mr. Cordner was "lulled" into any false sense of security or reliance. 
Even in his first deposition, Mr. Cordner testified: 
[Mr. Cordner] A: . . . And I said hell no, you violated the contract, I want my 
money back. Then he said, what if we moved the boundaries. Then 
I expressed my concern about. . . [enough room for a road, motel 
and restaurant.] 
[Mr. Cordner] A: . . . That's where the conversation was left is Darrell was 
going to change the boundary lines. 
[Mr. Nielsen] Q: Did he say that he would change the boundary lines? 
[Mr. Cordner] A: He said, what if I change the boundary lines? And I said that 
may work. 
[Mr. Nielsen] Q: But that's as far as it went? 
[Mr. Cordner] A: Yes. 
(R. Cordner dep., Vol. 1, pp.26-27) 
(See also, Cordner dep., Vol. 2, pp.23-25, that there was "no agreement".) Even 
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint alleged only that Ross "made an offer to change the 
boundaries," and that Cordner only indicated that even if Ross did so, "he [Cordner] 
might still be willing to honor the contract." (Am. Compl., ^27, R. 173) 
In light of Mr. Cordner's second deposition testimony, the admitted lack of any 
agreement or promise, and Plaintiffs' complete inaction for over seven years, the trial 
court properly revisited Plaintiffs' lack of evidence to support their claims. Trembly, 884 
P.2d at 1311. The summary judgment motion was properly considered by the trial court. 
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POINT IV 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT CLELLA ROSS 
PARTICIPATED IN OR MADE ANY ORAL AGREEMENT 
WITH OR MISREPRESENTATION TO PLAINTIFFS 
There is absolutely no evidence to support Plaintiffs' fraud claim against 
Defendant Clella C. Ross, the wife of Defendant Darrel Ross. Plaintiffs never spoke to 
her, nor she to them. Her only activity or involvement was to sign the original Uniform 
Real Estate Contracts and the April 1984 power line easement. There is no evidence that 
any discussions between Mr. Cordner and Mr. Ross had anything to do with Clella Ross 
or that she was in any way involved or implicated. (R. Cordner dep., Vol. 1, p. 10; Aff. 
Clella Ross, R.250-251) Mrs. Ross never authorized her husband to do or say anything 
to Plaintiffs regarding the allegations in Cause III of the Amended Complaint. 
(R.251, Aff. Clella Ross, ^fl3) There is no evidence that Mr. Cordner ever relied upon 
anything Clella Ross did or said. 
She never authorized any change in the written contracts now barred by 
limitations. (R.251, Aff. Clella Ross, [^13) There is no other allegation of the Amended 
Complaint or evidence which states any claim against Mrs. Ross. The Affidavit of Mrs. 
Ross (R.249-251) was unrebutted and unchallenged. 
The summary judgment in favor of Mrs. Ross should be affirmed for Plaintiffs' 
failure to state a claim and because there are no facts in the record to support any 
personal claim beyond a breach of contract which is clearly barred. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's summary judgment applying the statutes of limitations to bar 
Plaintiffs' claims should be affirmed. Defendants were properly entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law based upon Plaintiffs' amended allegations and own testimony. 
The judgment below should be affirmed. 
DATED this Z& day of February, 1997. 
HENRIOD & NIELSEN 
OafR R. Nielsen 
HENRIOD & NIELSEN 
Eagle Gate Tower, Suite 1160 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004 
Attorneys for Appellees Darrel L. Ross 
and Clella C. Ross 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
DARREL L. ROSS AND CLELLA C. ROSS were mailed first class, postage prepaid 
on the ZS day of February, 1997, to: 
Michael J. Petro 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
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ADDENDUM A 
ORDER AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT, R.304 
dated July 15, 1996 
Arthur H. Nielsen (2405) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Eagle Gate Tower, Suite 1100 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Clark R. Nielsen 
HENRIOD & NIELSEN 
Eagle Gate Tower, Suite 1160 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-0591 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




DARRELL L. ROSS and CLELLA C. 
ROSS, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 91CV125D 
The Honorable John R. Anderson 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment came before the above Court on 
Monday, June 18, 1996 at 1:45 p.m. for argument and determination; the Plaintiffs were 
represented by their attorney, Michael Petro, who appeared with the Plaintiff Robert 
Cordner; the Defendants were represented by Arthur H. Nielsen, Nielsen & Senior and by 
Clark R. Nielsen, Henriod & Nielsen, who appeared with Defendant Darrell Ross. 
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Addendum A 
After hearing the arguments of counsel, and having reviewed and considered the 
memoranda and affidavits filed herein, the depositions of the Plaintiff Robert Cordner, 
the Memorandum Decision dated September 14, 1992, and all other documents and 
pleadings filed herein, the Court makes the following determinations: 
The underlying facts relevant to Defendants' motion for summary judgment are 
undisputed. To the extent there is any disputed, relevant fact, the Court views the 
evidence in light most favorable to the Plaintiffs. The relevant facts are that the Plaintiffs 
and Defendants entered into two uniform real estate contracts in June 1981 and December 
1982; in breach of those contracts, Defendants gave an easement across the property in 
March or April 1984; Plaintiff Robert Cordner was personally aware of the easement and 
breach in July 1984, when he told Defendant Darrell Ross that Ross had breached his 
contract with the Plaintiffs. At that time, Mr. Cordner demanded his payments back. At 
that time, Defendant Ross offered to adjust the boundaries to the property being sold but 
no agreement was reached between the parties to do so or to return any payments made. 
After Mr. Cordner treated the contracts as breached by Defendants, Plaintiff did not take 
any legal action to enforce his rights or seek legal redress until August 1991. As a result, 
Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract, Causes I and II of the Amended Complaint, are 
barred by the six-year statute of limitation for actions on a written contract, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-23. 
2 
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Plaintiffs also claim that they were defrauded or lulled into inaction by the offer of 
Defendant Darrell Ross in July 1984 to change the boundaries and to get back to 
Plaintiffs regarding that offer. The parties were then on an equal footing and neither had 
any advantage over the other. There was neither any agreement between the parties to 
return any payments nor promise by Defendant Ross to change the boundaries. There is 
no evidence that the Defendants concealed any claim or fact from the Plaintiff or made 
any false representation that rises to the level of fraud. To the extent Plaintiffs claim the 
statute of limitations is tolled because they were lulled into inaction on their claims by the 
promise of, "FU get back to you," the Court determines that any reliance thereon for over 
seven years was unreasonable and does not excuse Plaintiffs' failure to act within the 
period of the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs' failure to institute a legal action for over 
seven years was not reasonable or excusable neglect, based upon the undisputed facts in 
this case. 
Although the result may appear to be unequitable based upon the amounts Mr. 
Cordner claims he has paid on the contracts, there is no reason not to apply the statutes of 
limitations when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs. Under 
any theory for recovery advanced in Plaintiffs' amended complaint or in their argument in 
opposition to summary judgment, the statute of limitations has run and the Plaintiffs' 
claims have expired. 
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R 
The Court independently concludes there is no evidence or factual allegation of 
any wrongdoing by the Defendant Clella Ross beyond any claim for breach of contract by 
giving the easement. As discussed, such claim is barred by the statute of limitations. 
Clella Ross is independently entitled to dismissal of all claims against her. 
After considering the entire record herein, and based upon the forgoing 
determinations, and good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment be and is hereby GRANTED. For the reasons set forth 
herein and those stated by the court in its oral ruling, summary judgment is hereby 
entered in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' complaint and 
each of Plaintiffs' claims therein are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
Dated this /£* day of July, 1996. 
w 
The Honorable John R. Anderson 
District Judge 
Seventh Judicial District Court 
Approved as to form: 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
AtWrfey for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Granting Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment was mailed first class, postage prepaid on the ZS^ay of 
June, 1996, to: 
Michael J. Petro 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
101 East 200 South 
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ADDENDUM B 
J. PAYNE "MINUTE ENTRY", R.85 
dated September 14, 1992 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
in and for Duchesne County 
of the State of Utah 
CIVIL MINUTE ENTRY 
T. ROBERT CORDNER & GLORIA CORDNER NO. 91-CV-125-D 
VS. DATE: SEPTEMBER 14, 1992 
BARREL L. ROSS 5c CLELLA C. ROSS JUDGE: A. LYNN PAYNE 
D E C I S I O N 
The matter comes before the undersigned pursuant to the defendants 
motion for Summary Judgment dated May 14, 1992. The court having 
reviewed the memorandum and affidavit now rules as follows: 
1. The Plaintiffs as "purchasers" and the defendants as "sellers" 
entered into uniform real estate contracts dated June 10, 1981 
and December 27, 1982. On or about April 6, 1984 the sellers 
granted Moon Lake Electric a utility easement across the property 
which they had previously agreed to convey to the sellers. By the 
end of July of 1984 purchasers became aware of the encumbrances 
when they observed large electrical lines upon the property. 
2. Thereafter, the parties discussed the existence of the power 
lines upon the property. The parties apparently disagree as to the 
nature of the discussion between the parties . For the purpose of 
their motion, sellers take the position that purchasers indicated 
that they didn't want the property; and that the purchasers 
instructed the sellers to sell the property and give them their 
money back. Purchasers do not dispute the above but also 
maintain that there was also discussion about moving the boundary 
line so that the utility easement would not be within the property 
to be conveyed. 
3. Often discovering the utility lines, the purchaser did not 
make further payment under the contract. However the purchaser did 
pay a portion of the property tax^S in November of 1984. 
4. Neither party brought action for breach of contract (i.e. the 
seller did not seek to enforce the provisions of the contract for 
failure to make installment payments and purchaser did not 
seek to enforce the provisions with resoect to breach of 
contract by creating an easement). 
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5. The sellers conveyed the property to third parties on December 
27, 1985, This deed was recorded with the Duchesne County 
Recorder on January 6, 1986. The property has not been improved 
since the original 1981 contract. 
6. After the parties discussion concerning taxes in November of 
1984 they did not again discuss this transaction until the commence-
ment of this action. During that time, the purchaser visited the 
property site at least four times. However, there was apparently 
nothing at the property site whichjwould indicate that the property 
had been resold. 
7. Generally the granting of a utility easement creates an 
encumbrance upon the property which can not be cured. In 
this case, a cause of action for breach of the contractual 
covenant not to create such easements would arise upon discovery of 
the easement in 1984. In this case the purchaser claims that the 
cause of action would not arise until the deed was to be conveyed 
upon full payment of the purchasejprice. However, because the 
purchaser did not continue to make payment it is clear that they 
elected to treat the existence ofythe easement as an immediate 
breach of the contract rather than to continue to make payments in 
the hope that the encumbrance could be cured. Therefore, under 
general principals of law the cause of action for breach would have 
existed by July of 1984, and six year statute would have expired 
prior to the filing of this action in August of 1991. 
8. However, in this case there is an issue as to whether the 
parties entered into an agreement wherein the sellers would resell 
the property and return the monies which purchaser had paid. From 
the facts in this case it is clear that the parties intended that 
the purchaser would continue to have some interest in the property, 
after July of 1984. This is evidenced by the request of the sellers 
that the purchasers help pay the property tax payments in November 
of 1984, and, arguably by the failure of the sellers to enforce the 
contract provision which required installment payments. The 
record is not clear as to whetherjthe parties entered into an 
agreement to resell the property or whether the sellers otherwise 
caused purchasers to reasonably believe that the property would be 
sold and the payments refunded. 
9. If the sellers lead the purchasers to reasonably believe that 
the property would be sold and that the payments would be returned, 
there exists an issue as to frauc^either at the time of the 
discussion in 1984 or fraud in the concealment of the sale. 
10. If the parties agreed that the property would be resold 
and the payments returned, that cause of action would not arise 
until the sale was made and the sellers did not return the 
payments. When fraud ia alleged, the cause of action may be 
tolled until the purchasers discovered the property had been 
sW/ 
resold, or with reasonable diligence tfould have discovered the sale 
of the property. In this case the purchasers did not discover 
the sale until 1990. Therefore, if there was fraud in concealing 
the sale the Statute of Limitations may not have run. 
11. The court will hold that the cause of action for breach under 
the original contract has run. Absent a further agreement to 
adjust the boundaries or to return the payments (or sellers 
actions which reasonably lead the purchasers to believe that the 
parties would adjust the boundaries or return payments), the 
statute of limitations has run on purchasers cause of action. 
However, the facts which have been presented to the court are not 
sufficient for the court to rule on .the legal affect of the parties 
discussions after the breach was discovered. The court can not 
rule as a matter of law that there was no fraud. 
12. In ruling on the above the court has obviously not accepted the 
filing of the deed to the third party purchasers in 1986 as notice 
as a matter of law. The filing of this notice however may be 
relevant to the issue of whether the purchaser should have 
discovered the sale by the use of reasonable diligence prior to 
December of 1990. 
13. While it is not necessary for the court to rule on the affect 
of the claimed change of $20.50 in 1986 the court is having 
difficulty understanding how this unilateral action on the part of 
the sellers could affect the purchasers cause of action for breach 
of the warranty of title. Often an acceptance of part payment may 
affect the timing of the sellers cause of action for breach of 
contract with respect to installment payments, but not the 
purchasers cause of action. Nevertheless, the court does not rule 
upon this issue at this time. 
Based upon the foregoing the Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
Dated this JL y day of September, 1992. 
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DARREL L. ROSS and CLELLA C. 
ROSS, 
Defendant. 
T. ROBERT CORDNER 
Civil No. 91 CV 125D 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 3rd day of February, 
1992, the deposition of the above-named witness was taken at 
the instance of Defendant at the offices of Nielson, Hill & 
Fisher, 3319 No. University, Ave., Suite 200, Jamestown 
Square, Provo, Utah commencing at the hour of 3:10 P.M. 
Said deposition taken pursuant to notice and 
stipulation and in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
C.S.R. LICENSE #93 
Penny C. Abbott, C.S.R, 
153 West 100 South 
Spanish Fork, Utah 846 
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1 we get through. 
2 A Okay. 
3 Q How frequently did you go out to Roosevelt to 
4 visit the property? 
5 A Not too often. I was at that time checking on 
6 a couple parts stores out there so I would hate to say how 
7 many times I went out there but not too many times. 
8 Q Did you ever draw a line or mark off the 
9 property which you were in the process of buying from him? 
10 A I just walked over it. I didn't draw a line or 
11 anything. 
12 Q Did there come a time when you observed that 
13 there was any construction that had been done on the 
14 property? 
15 A The only thing that I observed when I went out 
16 was that a power line had been put in. 
17 Q When did you do that? 
18 A Again, I'm just guessing. I would say in 
19 probably the last part of May of '84. Well, it may even 
20 have been later than that. June or July. It could have 
21 been right in that area. 
22 Q What stage of construction was the power line 
23 in? Had it been completed? 
24 A I didn't notice the completion immediately. I 
25 just seen the poles and came back and discussed it with Phil 
23 
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1 and then when Darrel came in we discussed it at the station. 
2 Q .The first time that you saw it there were just 
3 poles that were erected? 
4 A I'm not saying that, sir. I think the line 
5 could have been on it. I don't know. All I immediately 
6 noticed was somebody put a power line here. 
7 Q And what direction did the power line go? 
8 A It ran north and south. 
9 Q Did you observe whether any of those poles were 
10 located on any of the acreage that you understood you were 
11 buying? 
12 A That's correct. That's where the line went is 
13 on the property that I was purchasing. 
14 Q Was there more than one pole? 
15 A Oh, yes. 
16 Q Do you know how many poles? 
17- A No, I didn't. 
18 Q There were several poles that ran along on the 
19 property that you were buying? 
20 •. . , A Yes. 
21 Q Could you give me a little better description 
22 of its location? Were they on the east side of the poles or 
23 the west side or running east and west on the north side? 
24 A They were towards the east side. It appeared 
25 to me, but I don't know whether they were right over on the 
24 
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1 east boundary of my property or not, 
2 Q Did you actually make a survey to determine how 
3 many, if any, were on the specific property that you were 
4 buying? 
5 A I did not count the poles. I just discussed it 
6 with Darrel when he came in the station. 
7 Q How long after you observed the poles there was 
8 it that you talked to Darrel about it? 
9 A Just a few days after that. 
10 Q Who was present when you talked to him? 
11 A Phil Anderson. 
12 Q To the best of your recollection Mr. Cordner 
13 would you tell me what was said by you or Mr. Anderson and 
14 by Mr. Ross about this construction of poles which you said 
15 were on your property? 
16 A I told him at that time that the property was 
17 no good to me with an easement down through there, that's 
18 why I purchased the other acre of property, and that I 
19 didn't want the property, he could sell it to somebody else 
20 and give me my money back. 
21 Q What did he say? 
22 A I don't recall all the conversation and what he 
23 said. It was like well, it's to our benefit to get along 
24 with the power company. I said it's no good to me, I want 
25 my money back. So then our conversation went outside of our 
25 
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1 change house where it was just Darrel and I. 
2 Q On the same day? 
3 A Same day, same time. 
4 Q What happened to Mr. Anderson? 
5 A He was in the change room and he wasn't in the 
6 rest of the conversation. 
7 Q Did he engage in any conversation before he 
8 went to the change room and you and Darrel continued? 
9 A He stayed there. We were in the change room, 
10 that's where our desk was and the reports were done there. 
11 Q So you and Mr. Ross left the room and he stayed 
12 there? 
13 A Correct. We went outside just on the south 
14 side of the station and I expressed again to Darrel about 
15 the poles. And he said well, will you take your principle 
16 back and not the interest? And I said hell no, you violated 
17 the contract, I want my money back. Then he said, what if 
18 we moved the boundaries. Then I expressed my concern about 
19 there's a little road between us and the motel and et cetera 
20 where he was going to build. And he said that was no 
21 problem. I said, is there still enough room for the motel 
22 and restaurant? And he said yes. And that was the last 
23 conversation I had. Well, one other conversation was when 
24 he picked up this $211 check. 
25 Q I would gather then from what you've just told 
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1 me that this conversation took place to the best of your 
2 recollection in May, June or July of 1984? 
3 A It was in that area. The pole line was in. 
4 Whether the wiring was on it I couldn't testify to that. 
5 Q But you've now related to me to the best of 
6 your recollection what was said totally in that 
7 conversation? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q And then from then I understand you didn't hear 
10 from him again until later on in the fall? 
11 A That's right. That's where the conversation 
12 was left is Darrel was going to change the boundary lines. 
13 Q Did he say that he would change the boundary 
14 lines? 
15 A He said, what if I change the boundary lines? 
16 And I said that may work. 
17 Q But that's as far as it went? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q And from then until later in the fall he didn't 
20 talk to you again. Then you say he came to your service 
21 station in November of 1984? 
22 A He may have been in there in between that but 
23 that's the other time I seen him, yes. 
24 Q He may have been in to the station to buy 
25 product? 
27 
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1 A Right. 
2 Q But you didn't discuss this problem? 
3 A No. 
4 Q What service station was it that this 
5 conversation took place at? 
6 A Crestview Service on the 1594 South State. 
7 Q When he came in in November was there anyone 
8 with him? 
9 A No, not that I talked to. No, there wasn't 
10 anybody with him because he was parked on the southwest pump 
11 and I didn't see anybody in his car. 
12 Q Was there anyone with you that was involved in 
13 the conversation? 
14 A We had a cashier there but not involved in the 
15 conversation. 
16 Q As far as you're aware then just you and Darrel 
17 had the conversation? 
18 A No. Phil Anderson was there for the first 
19 part. But as I say, we had a cashier there but that was the 
20 only other party that was there at the time. 
21 Q I'm talking about the later conversation that 
22 happened in November as you have testified. 
23 A Oh, that conversation Phil Anderson was there. 
24 He wrote the check. 
25 Q So what was said when Darrel came to the 
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1 station to start out with? 
2 A He wanted to know about the taxes. And I said 
3 well, what about the property line? He said, I'm working o 
4 it. He said, will you help me out with this much on the 
5 taxes. So I told Phil we would do that and asked him how 
6 much and he told us $211.69. 
7 Q Did Phil say anything on that occasion, enter 
8 into the conversation at all? 
9 A I don't remember Phil saying anything other 
10 than just making out the check to him. 
11 Q Other than what you've now told me do you 
12 recall anything else that anybody said? 
13 A Not at that time, no. 
14 Q And this check which you indicated that was 
15 made out then on the 10th of November was for something tha 
16 you were giving him to help pay on the taxes? 
17 A On the 30th of November. 
18 Q Up to that time who had been paying the taxes 
19 on the property? 
20 A I assume part of it was taken out of the money 
21 I gave Darrel. I don't know. He would come out and I woul 
22 just write a check for a certain amount that I had at that 
23 time. 
24 Q You had never paid any? 
25 A Not unless one of these other checks has taxes 
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1 written on them. I mean, there might be a payment and taxes 
2 in it, I don't know without finding the remainder of the 
3 checks. 
4 Q I guess I kind of got cut off from my question. 
5 I was going to say you never paid the taxes directly to the 
6 county treasurer's office? 
7 A No. 
8 Q And other than the two that we've described, 
9 the last two there that are on your schedule you don't know 
10 whether any of the other checks may have identified taxes or 
11 what they may have been? 
12 A I can't be sure until I look at the checks. 
13 Q Following that conversation that you say was on 
14 the 30th of November, 1984, when was the next time you 
15 talked to Darrel Ross about this matter? 
16 A That was the last conversation I had with 
17 Darrel about it. 
18 Q You've not talked to him since? 
19 A No. 
20 Q Have you ever written him any letters? 
21 A No. 
22 Q Have you ever had an attorney write him a 
23 letter about the problem? 
24 A No. I just thought it was sitting there in 
25 limbo because there was no construction going on as far as 
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1 Q Did you ever have conversations with Mr. Ross 
2 in which you then in substance and effect said that because 
3 the economy has gone down here I'm not interested in 
4 pursuing it any further, I'll just forget about what I've 
5 paid on it and we'll go our own way? 
6 A Absolutely not. 
7 Q Did you ever ask him what he was going to do 
8 about this power line easement? 
9 A Well, that was our first, that's when our 
10 problems started. That's when I said— 
11 Q I mean, after that time. After that day he 
12 came into your service station and you gave him a check for 
13 200 some dollars, did you ever talk to him again about what 
14 if anything have you done about the power line easement? 
15 A No. 
16 Q Or about changing the description on the 
17 property? 
18 A Not since that day. 
19 Q You have been out there on many, many 
20 occasions? 
21 A Not many, many occasions. I've been out there 
22 on a few occasions since then. 
23 Q About how frequently would you go out to 
24 Roosevelt in this last seven or eight years? Let's make it 
25 since November 30th, 1984. 
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1 A Well, I'm trying to remember. I would say four 
2 times. 
3 Q Do you purchase product from the refinery out 
4 there? 
5 A No, not now. 
6 Q Have you purchased product from the refinery 
7 since 1984? 
8 A No. We pulled some product from Plateau but 
9 that was prior to 1984 though. I was trying to think. It 
10 was prior to 1984. 
11 Q Do you recall ever having a conversation with 
12 Mr. Ross when there was another person present whom I will 
13 identify as Mr. Mills? 
14 A Mr. Mills? There might have been another 
15 gentleman present but I didn't know who he was. 
16 Q But other than these conversations that you've 
17 had, do you recall any other conversation with Mr. Ross 
18 where there was a third person present? 
19 A No. Well, when we done up a schematic of the 
20 property and where the structure was going to be there was 
21 another party that was there at that time. 
22 Q Was that before or after you had signed the 
23 contracts on the property? 
24 A That was after. 
25 Q was it before or after this conversation that 
33 
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1 Q. Well, do you know any reason why he came out 
2 specifically for the payment at that time? 
3 A. Because it was due on the first contract. 
4 Q. When was it due on the first contract? 
5 A. In June, 
6 Q. Was it delinquent at that time? 
7 A. Just maybe a few days is all because it had 
8 to be in the latter part of June. 
9 Q. Isn't it true, Mr. Cordner, that after the 
10 first payment that you made, you were delinquent in all 
11 of your payments? 
12 A. I think in my last deposition I said that I 
13 was receiving monies in, and I'd give it to Darrel when 
14 he come out after money. It was agreeable to him. And 
15 I think up to that date on the contracts, I don't think 
L6 I was delinquent. 
L7 Q. Well, when you say "it was agreeable to 
L8 him,,! did you ever have a conversation with him in which 
L9 he told you it was all right with him if you didn't pay 
20 him? 
21 A. No. When he come out, I told him what I had 
22 in the bank. He said, "Fine. Give me that." And then 
23 I continued paying him whenever I got payments in. 
24 Q. Did you ever make a payment to him when he 
25 didn't come out and demand that you pay it because you 
21 
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1 were delinquent? 
2 A. He didn't demand. He'd come out and we'd 
3 discuss it and — 
4 Q. Requested? 
5 A. Yes. He requested some money, and I give 
6 him money at that time. 
7 Q. But I said, did you ever make a payment to 
8 him when he didn't request it beforehand? 
9 I A. Well, I don't recall that. I very possibly 
10 could have done. 
11 Q. But you don't know? 
12 , A. No. 
13 Q. Did you have more than one conversation with 
14 Mr. Ross regarding the question of the pole line 
15 easement that he had given to Moon Lake? 
16 A. The big conversation with the — the 
17 disagreement was the one we was talking about in the 
18 last part of June or the first part of July. The only 
19 other conversation about it is when I give him the $211 
20 check, and I asked him about the easement and about the 
21 property line. 
22 Q. And what, if anything, did he say? 
23 A. He said, "I'm working on it." 
24 Q. You didn't follow up on that at all after 
25 that date? 
22 
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1 A. No, I assumed — 
2 Q. Just answer the question. You didn't follow 
3 up on that after that date? 
4 A. No. 
5 Q. All right. And when he said that he was 
6 "working on it," he did not detail what, if anything, 
7 was being done on it at that time? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. And you did not inquire? 
10 A. No, I didn't. 
11 Q. Now, at that particular time, you had not 
12 agreed to any change in the property line, had you? 
13 A. It depended on where the property was going 
14 to be. 
15 Q. That is what I said. You had not agreed on 
16 that? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. And in that conversation that you had with 
19 him earlier in June, or if you refer to July, you had 
20 told him that you wanted your money back. 
21 A. That's correct. The first part of the 
22 conversation was that. 
23 Q. And when he offered, according to your 
24 testimony, to give you back your money without interest, 
25 you said, no, that you wanted it all, and that you were 
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1 not interested in taking any other property. 
2 A. No. I didn't say that. 
3 Q. Let me call your attention to your previous 
4 deposition — 
5 A. Okay. 
6 Q. — and see if you have any other 
7 recollection of that. Referring to page 26 of your 
8 deposition, you answered, after I asked you about th& 
9 conversation, "We went outside just on the south side of 
10 the station, and I expressed again to Darrel about the 
11 poles. And he said, 'Well, will you take your principle 
12 back and not the interest?' And I said, hell, no. You 
13 violated the contract, and I want my money back." 
14 Now, that was your testimony at that time, 
15 correct? 
16 A. That's correct. 
17 Q. And it is still your testimony, isn't it? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. I'm now going back to what your answer was, 
20 quoting, "Then he said, 'What if we move the 
21 boundaries?' Then I expressed my concern about there's 
22 a little road between us and the motel and et cetera, 
23 where was he going to build? And he said, 'That was no 
24 problem.' I said, is there still enough room for the 
25 motel and restaurant? He said, 'Yes.' That was the 
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1 last conversation I had. Well, the other one 
2 conversation was when he picked up the 211 check." 
3 Now, do you have anything to add to that 
4 statement and that testimony at this time? 
5 A. Only that I would have to see where he was 
6 going to move the property for the convenience or — and 
7 the gasoline installation. 
8 Q. Before you agreed to it? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. So there was no agreement at that time? 
11 A. No. 
12 MR. PETRO: We need to go off the record. 
13 (Off-the-record discussion.) 
14 (Mr. Petro excused himself for the remainder 
15 of the deposition. Mr. Young replaced Mr. Petro.) 
16 MR. NIELSEN: Let's go back on the record. 
17 I was about to address the amendments to the 
18 complaint Mike had made. I don't know whether you have 
19 a copy of the amended complaint there. But if you need 
20 to, I can let you look at mine. 
21 MR. YOUNG: Okay. 
22 Q. BY MR. NIELSEN: Under the third cause of 
23 action that you had in your amended complaint, 
24 Mr. Cordner, paragraph 27 says — it is referring to 
25 your discussion with Mr. Ross in this May through July 
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1 period that you've identified, that according to the 
2 allegation, "Defendant Ross made an offer to change the 
3 boundaries and indicated to Cordner that he had 
4 sufficient additional property to change the boundaries 
5 of the property sold to Cordner and that there would 
6 still be room for a motel, restaurant, and gas station. 
7 Cordner indicated to Ross that if he could change the 
I 
8 boundary lines and there was sufficient room to 
9 construct the improvements that he anticipated, he might 
10 still be willing to honor the contract." 
11 Is that a rather similar statement of what 
12 your testimony has just been before? 
13 A. If the frontage was right, and if it 
14 accommodated what we was originally planned to put on 
15 this. 
16 Q. That you still might do it? 
17 A. And if he, of course, went ahead with the 
18 motel and restaurant because the station wasn't any good 
19 to us without the motel and restaurant. We couldn't 
20 survive. 
21 Q. Now, you didn't ever make that statement to 
22 him at that time, that if the motel and the restaurant 
23 was — 
24 A. Well, I think the representation on the 
25 whole project was if the restaurant and the motel went 
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1 in. 
2 Q. And if Mr. Ross went bankrupt and there was 
3 no motel and restaurant, you didn't intend to go through 
4 with the project? 
5 A. No, because we couldn't survive. 
6 Q. But at no time have you previously said that 
7 that was a part of your conversation, have you? 
8 A. Well, from the very — 
9 Q. Just answer the question. You haven't, have 
10 you? 
11 A. At the first of the sale when it was 
12 represented to us, yes. 
13 Q. Well, when did you make that statement 
14 previously in your deposition? 
15 A* I didn't make it in the deposition. 
16 Q. All right. That's what I am saying. And in 
17 your pleadings, it's never been stated in your pleadings 
18 that there was a condition attached to your purchase of 
19 the property? 
20 MR. YOUNG: I object to the form of the 
21 question, if you know, Mr. Cordner, what is in the 
22 pleadings. 
23 THE WITNESS: Well, no. I don't know what's 
24 in the pleadings. 
25 Q. BY MR. NIELSEN: All right. Now, the next 
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1 statement in the next paragraph was, MAt the time Darrel 
2 Ross made the statement, he knew or should have known 
3 that they were untrue." Now, this is the statement I 
4 just read to you. Now, what portion of that statement 
5 that I read to you out of your pleadings do you claim is 
I 
6 untrue or recklessly made with the intent to deceive 
7 you? 
8 A. Because I think when he made the offer that 
9 he didn't have any intent to do it. And I think that he 
10 frauded me by not getting back to me. 
11 Q. Well, with reference to that matter, you say 
12 that you think that he did. What proof do you have? 
13 A. Because he never got back to me, and I was 
14 waiting to hear from him. 
15 Q. Well, did you ever get back to him? 
16 A. No, because I — he was the one that was 
17 going to do the changing, and I was waiting for him to 
18 get back to me. 
19 Q. Just waiting for a period of some six years? 
20 A. And the fact that there was no construction 
21 going on out there. So I sit there and waited, yes. 
22 Q. And that is the only evidence that you have 
23 now is that he thought — that he knew it was untrue or 
24 that he recklessly made it because he never got back to 
25 you? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Okay. You never went to him to either have 
3 him pay you the money or do anything about it? 
4 A. I was waiting for him to get back to me. 
5 When he left, that was the conversation. I assumed that 
6 he was going to get back to me. 
7 Q. But my question is, did you ever go to him 
8 and ask him for your money back? 
9 A. No, not after what's in the deposition. 
10 Q. Okay. 
11 MR. YOUNG: Excuse me, Mr. Cordner. Do you 
12 mean the pleadings or the deposition? 
13 THE WITNESS: The deposition of our last 
14 conversation which was 11-30 of '84. 
15 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Thank you. 
16 Q. BY MR. NIELSEN: Now, again, with reference 
17 to paragraph 32, you allege that the defendants' actions 
18 were willful and malicious. Now, other than what you've 
19 now testified that he never got back to you, do you have 
20 any evidence that Mr. Ross' actions were willful and 
21 malicious? 
22 A. Only, again, that he never got back to me or 
23 made any attempt to get back to me. He sold the 
24 property and never notified me or anything. 
25 Q. Well, now, when you speak that he sold the 
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ADDENDUM E 
AMENDED COMPLAINT (R. 167-182) 
filed October 15, 1993 
COPY 
MICHAEL J. PETRO (4241) 
YOUNG & KESTER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, UT 84663 
Telephone: (801)489-3294 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DUSCHENE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 




DARREL L. ROSS & CLELLA C. ROSS, 
Defendant. 
#BF COMPLAINT 
Case No: 91CV125D 
—oooOooo— 
COME NOW the plaintiffs and for cause of action allege as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
RECISSION 
1. The plaintiffs at all times herein mentioned were residents of Utah County, 
State of Utah. 
2\. The defendants at all times herein mentioned were residents of Duschene 
County, State of Utah. 
I 
3'. The real property which is the subject of this action is located in the 
Duschene County, State of Utah. 
4[ On or about the 10th day of June, 1981, the plaintiffs entered into an 
agreement with the defendants whereby the plaintiffs agreed to purchase approximately two 
i t \U>1 
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acres of real property located in the Duschene County, State of Utah, which is more 
particularly described as follows: 
Commencing at the Southwest Corner of Section 29, Township 2, South, Range 1 
West of the Uintah Special Base and Meredian; Thence East 139.39 feet; Thence 
North 384.27 feet to the North right-of-way line of U.S. Highway 40; Thence 
North 55°55,20" East 1250.98 feet along said right-of-way line to the Southeast 
Corner of the MUNICIPAL AIRPORT INDUSTRIAL PARK SUBDIVISION, 
said point being the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING: 
Thence South SS^S^O" West 184.98 feet along said North right-of-way line to the 
East right-of-way line of a City Street; Thence North 34°04'40" West 304.11 feet 
along said right-of-way; Thence North 55o55'20H East 387.97 feet to the East line 
of said SUBDIVISION; 
Thence South 0°21'20M East 365.63 feet along said East line to the TRUE POINT 
OF BEGINNING, containing 2.00 acres. 
5. The property was purchased subject to a Uniform Real Estate Contract dated 
June 10, 1981 which required the plaintiffs to pay the sum of $40,000 which was payable 
as follows: $8,000 on or before September 1, 1981 and annual payments of $6,000 plus 
interest due annually for five years commencing on the 10th day of June, 1982. 
6. A copy of the Uniform Real Estate Contract dated June 10, 1981 is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" and is incorporated herein by reference. 
7. The plaintiffs purchased said real property for use as a truck stop, service 
station and car wash. 
8. On December 27, 1982, the plaintiffs entered into a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract with the defendants for the purchase of an additional approximate one acre parcel 
of property located adjacent to real property described in the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
dated June 10, 1981. Said real property purchased on December 27, 1982 is more 
particularly described as follows: 
2 9-
Commencing at a Southwest Corner of Section 29, Township 2 South, Range 1 
West of the Uintah Special Base and Meredian; Thence East 139.39 feet; Thence 
North 384.27 feet to the North right-of-way line of U.S. Highway 40; Thence 
North 55°55f20" East 1250.98 feet along said right-of-way line to the Southeast 
Corner of the MUNICIPAL AIRPORT INDUSTRIAL PARK SUBDIVISION; 
Thence North 0o21'20M West 365.63 feet along the East line of said 
SUBDIVISION to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING: Thence South 55°55'20" 
West 387.97 feet to the East right-of-way of a City Street; 
Thence North 34°04'40" West 103.13 feet along said right-of-way line; Thence 
North 55°55'20" East 456.80 to said East SUBDIVISION line; Thence South 
0°21'20" East 123.99 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING, containing 1.00 
acres. 
9. Pursuant to the Uniform Real Estate Contract dated December 27, 1982 the 
plaintiffs were to pay to the defendants the sum of $20,000 which was to be paid $5,000 in 
cash and the balance of $15,000 was to be paid at $3,000 plus 12% accrued interest per 
year commencing on the 31st day of January, 1984 and the 31st day of January of each 
succeeding year until the entire unpaid balance of $15,000 plus interest at 12% per annum 
was paid in full. 
| 0 . A copy of the Uniform Real Estate Contract dated December 27, 1982 is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and is incorporated herein by reference. 
11. The plaintiffs paid the down payment of $8,000 required in the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and the down payment of $5,000 
required in the Uniform Real Estate contract attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and thereafter 
made the payments required under the respective contract until such time as plaintiffs 
discovered defendants had conveyed the power line easement hereinafter described. 
12. In 1984 the defendant conveyed a power line easement which encroached 
upon the real property described in paragraphs 4 and 8 above and which rendered the 
property described in paragraphs 4 and 8 above as unsuitable for use as a service station 
site, truck stop and car wash. 
13. Said power line easement was1 granted by the defendants Darrel L. and 
Clella Ross to Moon Lake Electric Association by a right-of-way dated April 6, 1984, 
recorded April 20, 1984, as Entry No. 238511, in book A-113 at page 311 of the official 
records of the Duschene County recorder. 
14. The plaintiffs made demand upon the defendants to either clear tide to the 
subject property by removing the power line easement or to return the plaintiffs' money to 
them. 
15. The defendants, without notifying the plaintiffs thereafter, sold the real 
property described in paragraphs 4 and 8 above to George W. Mills and Diana F. Mills by 
virtue of a special warranty dated December 27, 1985, recorded January 6, 1986, as Entry 
No. 250927, in book A-138, at page 626-627 of the official records of the Duschene Co. 
Recorder. 
16. At the time the plaintiffs spoke to the defendants concerning the power line 
easement, the plaintiffs advised the defendants of their desire to rescind the two 
aforementioned Uniform Real Estate Contracts conditioned upon payment to the plaintiffs 
by the defendants of the down payment made by the plaintiffs to the defendants. 
17. The defendants have failed and refused to return to the plaintiffs the down 
payments made on the two aforementioned Uniform Real Estate Contracts and the yearly 
payments paid by the plaintiffs to the defendants. 
18. The defendants have continued to fail and refuse to return to the plaintiffs 
the purchase price and yearly installments made by the plaintiffs. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray judgment on their First Cause of Action as follows: 
1. For judgment against the defendants rescinding the two aforementioned 
Uniform Real Estate Contracts and ordering the defendants to return to the $8,000 and 
$5,000 down payments and the yearly payments made by the plaintiffs to the defendants in 
an amount subject to proof at trial. 
2. For interest at the prevailing legal rate from the time the down payments and 
other payments were made to the defendants. 
3. for costs of suit incurred herein. 
4. for such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper in the 
premises. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
^9. plaintiffs and re-allege and incorporate herein by reference paragraphs 1 
through 18 above, as though set forth in full herein. 
£0. That the defendants have breached the Uniform Real Estate Contracts 
entered into witfr the plaintiffs in that the defendants pursuant to Paragraph 19 of the 
Aforementioned Uniform Real Estate Contracts agreed to execute and deliver to the sellers a 
good and sufficient warranty deed conveying title to two respective parcels of property 
described in the two respective Uniform Real Estate Contracts free and clear of all liens and 
encumbrances except as mentioned in the Uniform Real Estate Contracts. 
21. At the time the parties entered into the two Uniform Real Estate Contracts, 
the power line easement granted by the defendants was not an encumbrance on the two 
subject parcels of real property. 
22. The plaintiffs up to the time they discovered that the defendants had granted 
a power line easement in breach of the Uniform Real Estate Contracts had performed all of 
the terms, covenants and conditions required by them to be performed under the two 
respective Uniform Real Estate Contracts. 
5
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23. The defendants breached the aforementioned Uniform Real Estate Contracts 
by conveying a power line easement to the power line company. 
24. That pursuant to Paragraph 21 of the subject Uniform Real Estate Contracts, 
in the event of a default under the terms or agreements contained in the Uniform Real Estate 
Contracts, the defaulting party was required to pay and all costs and expenses, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee which may arise or accrue from enforcing the terms of the 
Uniform Real Estate Contracts. 
25. The plaintiffs have been required to obtain the services of an attorney to 
represent them in this matter and are entitled to attorney's fees in an amount subject to proof 
at trial. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray judgment as follows: 
1. For general and special damages suffered by the plaintiffs as a result of the 
defendants' breach of the two aforementioned Uniform Real Estate Contracts, including the 
return of all sums, together with interest at the prevailing legal rate, paid by the plaintiffs to 
the defendants pursuant to the two aforementioned Uniform Real Estate Contracts. 
2. For costs of suit incurred herein. 
3. For attorney's fees in an amount subject to proof at trial. 
4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper in the 
premises. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
FRAUD 
26. Plaintiffs and re-allege and incorporate herein by reference paragraphs 1 
through 25 as though set forth in full herein. 
6 
27. That on or about May through July of 1984 the plaintiff T. Robert Cordner 
and the defendant Darrel L. Ross had a meeting wherein they discussed the fact that the 
power line had been conveyed and constructed over the subject real property. At that 
meeting, Ross asked Cordner if Cordner would take the money back paid by Cordner 
pursuant to the Contract without interest. Cordner indicated he would not and that he 
wanted his money back. The defendant Ross then made an offer to change the boundaries 
and indicated to Cordner that he had additional sufficient property to change the boundaries 
of the property sold to Cordner and that there would still be room for a motel, restaurant 
and gas station. Cordner indicated to Ross that if he could change the boundary lines and 
there was sufficient room to construct the improvements that he anticipated, that he might 
still be willing to honor the contract. 
28. That at the time Darrell L. Ross made the above statements he knew or 
should have known that they were untrue or were recklessly made and made with the intent 
deceive Cordner into waiting for Ross to cure the problem which existed with respect to the 
subject property either by paying back Cordner the money that he had paid pursuant to the 
contract or by changing the boundaries to allow sufficient room for a motel, restaurant and 
gas station. 
29. That the plaintiffs discovered on or about December, 1990 that the 
defendants had re-sold the 2 subject parcels of property without returning the plaintiffs 
money to them, without first attempting to change the boundaries or without notifying the 
plaintiffs of the fact the defendants intended to sell the subject real property. 
30. That Cordner relied upon the representations of Ross and waited for Ross to 
cure the defect which existed with respect to the subject property by either returning to 
7 
Cordner the money he had paid pursuant to the contract or changing the boundaries so that 
there was sufficient room for a motel, restaurant and gas station. 
31. That Cordner was injured by the representations of Ross in that Ross sold 
the subject property and defeated the interest of Cordner which was created by the subject 
Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
32. That the defendant's actions were willfiill and malicious and as a result 
thereof, plaintiffs are entitled to punitive and exemplary damages in an amount subject to 
proof at trial. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray judgment on their Third Cause of Action as 
follows: 
1. For general and special damages due to plaintiffs because of defendants' 
breach of contract. 
2. For punitive and exemplary damages in an amount subject to proof at trial. 
3. For attorney's fees in an amount subject to proof at trial. 
4. For costs of suit incurred herein. 
5. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper in the 
premises. 
SIGNED and DATED this 
:HAELJ.PETRO 
£ n + 
Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing postage pre-
paid on the _, 1993 to Arthur Nielson, Suite 1100, Eagle 




UNIFPRM REAL ESTATE CO' rRACT 
June _ 81 
. 1. T H I S A G R E E M E N T , made in duplicate this L 2 day of ^ : A. D., 19 
by .nd between P a r r e l L. Ross and C l e l l a C. Ross __ _ 
hereinafter des ignated as the Seller, and 
T. Robert Cordner and G l o r i a Uordner 
hereinafter des ignated A S the Buyer, of . — _ _ — —: . * « • 
e
 Tv,0 a c r e s in the Mall Area Of TheAirport Ind . Park . 
2. W I T N E S S E T H : That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer, 
and the buver for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate in 
th. cou-ty'oi Duchesne
 SUM „, „,.„, <„...;,. _ R o o g . e v e l t ' U t a h 
Aoofttsa 
More part icularly described aa fo l lows: 
Description Attached As Schedule A. 
D e s c r i p t i o n At tached As Schedule B Option To purchase One y ea r From 
The Date of this Agreement and Contract.The Price tobe $20,000.00 
Far the one Acre Described.If not Purchased one year from now The 
Buyer w i l l have the F i r s t Right o r Rufusal to Purchase , But the 
Price to be Negotiated By Both Paarties. 
3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of 
S*4>O.00O-00 For ty Thousand and no / loo
 DolUrs ,« **0,000.00 } 
vl . ,u ,* , c ii v A 3021 Comanche Ln. Provo Ut . 84601 
payable at the office of Seller, his ass igns or order ±L _ _ 
str ict ly wi th in the fol lowing t imes , to-wit: TWO T h 0 U . S a n d & J f a / l Q Q ' f 2 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 - ^ 
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of J_32 , i_0y .0 . i _y_9 shall be paid as follows: 
$ 8 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 To be pa id Sep. 1 1981 
Annual Payments of $6 ,000 .00 P lus I n t r e s t due Annually For 5 Years 
On t h e 10 t h . Day of June 1982 
Possess ion of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the 1 0 t h day of ^ U n e , l S & i _ _ . 
4. Said monthly payments are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the 
principal. Interest shall be charged f iom J . U n f i „1 Q t h 1 9 8 3 on all unpaid portion! of the 
purchase price at the rate of x W e l V e
 p * r c e n t ( _ _ J L ~ r\ ) per annum. The Buyer, at his option at anytime, 
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage 
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied cither to unpaid principal or m prepayment of future 
instal lments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made. 
5. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Bu>er on this contract less than according 
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will m no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture 
hereinafter st ipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller. 
6. Tt xc . understood that .there aii-«c-ctlv exi&ts an ohlig^Jion au*a\n«t -»aid proprrtv in favor of 
F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank" ( e n t i r e Tracx) 
2U,000.00
 as of June 1981 
th an unpaid balance of 
T. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes n»venng improvements to said prem-
ises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for. outstanding against said prop-
n /a 
erty, except the fo l lowing _ C _ 
8. The Sel ler is g iven the option to secure, execute and maintain loans seruted by said property of not to exceed the 
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed percent 
( .1.4 r' ) per annum and payable in regular monthly instal lments; provided that the agrregate monthly installment 
pa\m«mts required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each installment payment required to be 
made by the Buyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such 
loans and m o r t g a g e s the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property 
subject to said loans and mortgages . 
S*. If the Buyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated pajments under this agreement to pay off any obli-
gations outs tanding at date of this agreement against said property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and 
pay any penal ty which mar be required on prepayment of said prior obligations. PrepAvm+ni penalties in respect 
to obl igat ions aga ins t said property incurred by seller, after date of this agreement , shall be paid by seller unless 
said obl igat ions are assumed or approved by buyer. 
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such 
amount as can be secured under the regulations of said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upun 
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half the exper ;es necessary in ob-
taining ?aid loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one-half, provided however, that the monthly payments and 
interest rat* required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest rate as outlined above. 
11. The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and as«e«sments of every kind and nature which are or which may he as«e««ed 
and which may become due on these premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrtes 
that there are no assessments against said premises except the fol lowing: 
The Seller further covenants and agrees that he will not default in the payment of his obligations against said property. 
* 0 « M l 0 6 - - U N l f C « I M R C * L CSTATC CONT * AC T - • t u T CO »« «• s i N i N t n u t N S i r EXHIBIT 
SCHEDULE A 
Commencing at the Southwest Corner of Section 29, Township 2 South, 
Range 1 West of the Uintah Special Base and Meridian; Thence 
East 139.39 feet; Thence North 384.27 feet to the North right-of-way 
line of U.S. Highway 40; Thence North 55* 55 '20* East 1250.98 feet 
along said right-of-way line to the Southeast Corner of the MUNICIPAL 
AIRPORT INDUSTRIAL PARK SUBDIVISION, said point being the TRUE POINT 
OF BEGINNING: 
Thence South 55*55'20" West 184.98 feet along said North right-of-way 
line to the East right-of-way line of a C i ty Street; 
Thence Nor.th 34*04'40" West 304.11 feet along said right-of-way; 
Thence North 55*55$20" East 387.97 feet to the East line of said 
SUBDIVISION; 
Thence South 0*21'20" East 365.63 feet along said East line to the 
TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING, containing 2.00 acres. 
SCHEDULE B 
Commencing at the Southwest Corner of Section 29, Township 2 South, 
Range 1 West of the Uintah Special Base and Meridian; Thence 
East 139.39 feet; Thence North 384,27 feet to the North right-of-way 
line of U.S. Highway 40; Thence North 55* 55' 20" East 1250.98 feet 
along said right-of-way line to the Southeast Corner of the MUNICIPAL 
AIRPORT INDUSTRIAL PARK SUBDIVISION; Thence North 0*21*20" West 365.63 
feet along- the East line of said SUBDIVISION to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING: 
Thence South 55*55'20" West 387.97 feet to the East right-of-way of a 
City S tree t ; 
Ihence North 34*04'40" West 103.13 feet along said right-of-way line; 
Thence North 55*S5'20" East 456.80 to said East SUBDIVISION line-
Thence South 0*21*20" East 123.99 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING, 
containing 1.00 acres. 
"THIS IS A ,Lir U N O I N G CONTRACT IF NOT UNOMSTOOO 'ill*. CO* WT AOVICE 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
1. T H I S A G R E E M E N T , made in duplicate this 2 7 - t h . day *t D E C .
 A < D . , 19 8 2 
by and between P a r r e l 1 Rosa & C l g l l a H. Rn*g 
hereinafter designated as the Seller, and . 
T. Robert Cordner & G l o r i a Cordner 
hereinafter designated aa the Buyer , of Q n P A r r P i n T h P M a l l A r f i f t O f T h f i 
A i r p o r t I n d u s t r i a l Park 
2. W I T N E S S E T H : That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer, 
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate in 
the county of D u c h e S n e state of Utah, to-wit: R Q Q S e v e l t . U t a h . 
AOOftcas 
More particularly described as fo l lows: 
D e s c r i p t i o n At tached a s Schedule B. 
3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of . 
$ 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 Twenty thousand and nn/1 00 Dollars <y 2 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) 
payable at the office of Seller, h i . a s s i g n , or order 3 0 2 1 C o m a n c h e L n . P r O V O , U t a h . 8 4 6 0 1 
str ict ly within the fol lowing t imes , to-wit: $ 5 , 0 0 0 - 0 0 & H O / l O O
 ( < 5 , O O O T O O ^ 
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of s 1 3 > 0 0 0 . 0 0
 s n a l l be paid as follows: 
$3,000.00 to be paid January 31,, 1984 Plus 12% Intrest. 
Annual Payments of $3,000.00 Per Year on January 31st. Of each Year. 
Untill the Ballance of $15,000.00 Is Paid off In Full. 
This will be a Five year contract after the 
$5,000.00 Down Payment.At $3,000.00 Per Year Plus 12% Intrest On 
all unpayed Ballance. 
Possess ion of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the 
3 1 s t
 day of January IQ 83 
4. Said monthly payments are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the 
principal. Interest shall be charged from J d T I U d r y J l S.t . t on all unpaid portions of the 
purchase price at the rate of r W e i v e
 p e r c e n t ( 1 _ _ <%) p e r annum. The Buyer, at his option at anytime, 
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage 
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future 
instal lments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made. 
5. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according 
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way slter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture 
hereinafter st ipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller. 
6. It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of . 
vith an unpaid balance of 
as of . 
7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said prem-
ises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said prop-
erty, except the fol lowing , 
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the 
then 'npaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed _____ percent 
( %) per annum and payable in regular monthly installments; piovided that the a g r e g a t e monthly installment 
payments required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each installment payment required to be 
made by the Buyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such 
loans and mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property 
subject to said loans and mortgage*. 
9. If the Buyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obli-
gat ions outstanding at date of th is agreement against said property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume anil 
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of »aid prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect 
to obl igations against said property incurred by seller, after date of this agreement, snail be paid by seller unless 
said obl igations are assumed or approved by buyer. 
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such 
amount as can be secured under the regulations of said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon 
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half the expenses necessary in ob-
taining laid loan, the Seller agree ing to nay the other one-half, provided however, that the monthly payments and 
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest rate as outlined above. 
11. The Buyer agrees to par all taxes and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed 
and which may become due on these premises during the life of thi* agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees 
that there are no assessments aga ins t said premises except the following: 
The Seller further covenants and agrees that he will not default in the payment of his obligations against said property. 
*XHIB!T 
Tho Buyer agrees t the general taxes after « 
13. The Buyer further agrees to keep all Insurable building* and improvements on said premises Insured in a com-
pany acceptable to the Seller in the amount of not less than the unpaid balance on this contract, or t_ 
and to assign said insurance to the Seller as his interests may appear and to deliver the insurance policy to htm. 
W. In the event the Buyer shall default in the payment of any special or general taxes, assessments or insurance 
premiums as herein provided, the Seller may, at his option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either 
of them, and if Seller elects so to do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums so advanced 
and paid or him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of \ of one percent per 
month until paid. 
15. Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon 
said premises, and that he will maintain said premises in good condition. 
1«. In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer, to make 
. days thereafter, the any payment or payments when the same shall become due, or within _____ 
Seller, at his option shall have the following alternative remedies: 
A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer to remedy the default within five days after written notice, 
to be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey said property, and all payments which have 
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for 
the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter and take 
possession of said premises without legal processes as in its first and former estate, together with all improve-
ments and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain with 
the land become the property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or 
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment tor all delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys 
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting 
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default): or 
C. The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid 
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this contract as a note and mortgage, and pass 
title to the Buyer subject thereto, snd proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of 
the State of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing, 
including costs and attorney's fees; and the Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency which may remain. 
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to 
the appointment ot a receiver to take ponstssion of said mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues and 
profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant 
to order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession 
of the said premises during the period of redemption. 
17. ft is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement 
18. In the event there are any liens or encumbrances against said premises other than those herein provided for or 
referred to, or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue againat the 
same by acts or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at his option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit 
on the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the pay-
ments herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until such time as such suspended 
payments shall equal any sums advanced as aforesaid. 
19. The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned 
agrees to execute snd deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to th« 
above described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued 
by or through the acta or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount 
of the purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time of sale or at any time during the 
term of this agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, at the option of Buyer. 
20. It is hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property 
in its present condition and that there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto with 
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto 
21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained here-
in, that the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise 
or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any 
remedy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit 
or otherwise. 
22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, suc-
cessors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties to this agreement have hereunto signed their names, the day and year 
first above written. 
Signed in the presence of 
.h/-,J ¥/**''; *-' 
/ • : 














THIS IS A I H » A U * BINDING CONTRACT IF NOT UNDERSTOOD SEt* C O M P I
 C N T ADVICE 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this 2 7 ^ h . day «f D E C * , A. D , 19 Q 2 , 
by and betwaan P f t r r g l 1 ROSS & CI fill a C . RnFlfl 
hereinafter designated as the Seller, and . 
T. Robert Cordner & G lo r i a Cordner 
hereinafter designated aa the Buyer, of Onp A/> rp i n TVIP M a l l A r p a O f T h p 
Airport Indus t r i a l Park 
2 WITNESSETH That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer, 
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate in 
the county of Duchegne
 S u t e o{ u taht to.wlt Roosevel t i Utfrht 
A O D R C I I 
More particularly described as follows: 
Description Attached as Schedule B. 
3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of. 
$20.000.00 Twenty thousand and nn/1 00 Dollars <$_ 
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order 3 0 2 1 C o m a n c h e L n . PrOVO , U t a h . 8 ^ 6 0 1 
• •, o. •». , „ • • , $ 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 & n o / 1 0 0 , t 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , 
strictly within the following times, to-wit _____ l (j -^  ' ) 
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of t J-5 t 0 0 0 * 0 0
 shall be paid as follows: 
$3,000.00 to be paid January 31,, 1984 Plus 12% Intrest. 
Annual Payments of $3,000.00 Per Year on January 31st. Of each Year. 
Untill the Ballance of $15,000.00 Is Paid off In Full. 
This will be a Five year contract after the 
$5,000.00 Down Payment.At $3,000,00 Per Year Plus 12% Intrest On 
all unpayed Ballance. 
Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the 3 - s ' t day of J a n u a r y ^ 19 ° 3 
4 Said monthly payments are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the 
principal Interest shall be charged from J a n u a r y — 3 - - W t on all unpaid portions of the 
purchase price at the rate of ITJ&IVQ
 p e r c e n t ( 1__ rrc) p e r annum The Buyer, at his option at anytime, 
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage 
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future 
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made 
5 It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according 
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture 
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller 
6 It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of . 
. with an unpaid balance of 
as of . 
7 Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said prem-
ises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said prop-
erty, except the following _____ 
8 The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the 
then tnpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed percent 
( %) per annum and payable in regular monthly installments, piovided that the agregate monthly installment 
paj menu required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each installment payment required to be 
made by the Buyer under this contract When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such 
loans and mortgages the Seller agrees to conve) and the Bujer agrees to accept title to the above described property 
subject to said loans and mortgages. 
9 If the Buyer desires to exercise his rijjht through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obli-
gations outstanding at date of this agreement against said property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and 
pay any penalty which may be required on prepa>ment of *aid prior obligations Prepa\ment penalties in respect 
to obligations against said property incurred b> seller, after date of this agreement, shall be paid by seller unless 
said obligations are assumed or approved by buyer 
10 The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such 
amount as can be secured under the regulations of said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon 
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half the expenses necessar> in ob-
taining said loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one half, provided however, that the monthly pa>ments and 
interrst rate required, shall not exceed the monthly pa>ments and interest rate as outlined above. 
11 The Buyer sgrees to par »H taxes and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed 
and which may become due on these premises during the life of thi« agreement The Seller hereby covenants and agrees 
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following 
The Seller further covenants and agrees that he will not default in the pa) ment of his obligations against said property. 
nCHIBJT 
12. The Buyer agreei to
 r~y the general taxes after . 
13. The Buyer further agrees to keep all insurable buildings and improvements on said premises insured in a com-
pany acceptable to the Seller tn the amount of not less than the unpaid balance on this contract, or t_ 
and to assign said insurance to the Seller as his interests may appear and to deliver the insurance policy to him. 
14. In the event the Buyer shall default in the payment of any special or general taxes, assessment* or insurance 
premiuma as herein provided, the Seller may, at his option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either 
of them, and if Seller elects so to do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums so advanced 
and paid by him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of v4 of one percent per 
month until paid. 
15. Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon 
said premises, and that he will maintain said premises in good condition. 
1«. In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer, to make 
. days thereafter, the any payment or payments when the same shall become due, or within . 
Seller, at his option shall have the following alternative remedies: 
A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure o( the Buyer to remedy the default within five days sfter written notice, 
to be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey
 said property, and ail payments which have 
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for 
the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter and take 
possession of said premises without legal processes as in its firM and former estate, together with all improve-
ments and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain with 
the land become the property ot the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or 
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment for all delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys 
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting 
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default): or 
C. The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid 
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this contract as a note and mortgage, and pass 
title to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of 
the State of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing, 
including costs and attorney's fees; and the Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency which may remain. 
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to 
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues and 
profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant 
to order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession 
ot the said premises during the period of redemption. 
17. It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement. 
18. In the event there are any liens or encumbrances against said premises other than those herein provided for or 
referred to, or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against the 
same by acts or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at his option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit 
on the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the pay-
ments herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until such time as such suspended 
payments shall equal any sums advanced as aforesaid. 
19. The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned 
agrees to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the 
above described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued 
by or through the acts or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount 
of the purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time of sale or at any time during the 
term o( this agreement, or at time ot delivery ot deed, at the option of Buyer. 
20. It is hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property 
in its present condition and that there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto with 
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto — 
21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained here-
in, that the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise 
or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any 
remedy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State ot Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit 
or otherwise. 
22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, suc-
cessors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties to this agreement^have hereunto signed their names, the day and year 
first above written. 
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